Using plant-level data from the Plant Capacity Utilization (PCU) survey, we explore how manufacturing plants' use of temporary workers is associated with the nature of their output fluctuations and other plant characteristics. We find that plants tend to use temporary workers when their output is expected to fall; this may indicate that firms use temporary workers to reduce costs associated with dismissing permanent employees. In addition, we find that plants whose future output levels are subject to greater uncertainty tend to use more temporary workers. We also examine the effects of wage and benefit levels for permanent workers, unionization rates, turnover rates, seasonal factors, and plant size and age on the use of temporary workers; based on our results, we discuss various views of why firms use temporary workers.
Introduction
The rapid growth of the temporary help services industry (THS) over the last quarter century has attracted substantial attention from researchers (e.g. , Erickcek, Houseman, and Kelleberg (2002) , Golden (1996) , Houseman (2001) , Polivka (1996) , and Sullivan (1995, 1997) ) who, along with industry analysts, have identified a number of reasons why using temporary workers may be attractive to client firms beyond their traditional role of filling in when permanent employees are absent for short periods. In particular, several authors have suggested that firms use temporary workers to accommodate fluctuations in production levels. However, little research formally investigates this hypothesis. In this paper, we attempt to fill a gap in the literature by investigating which firm characteristics are associated with the use of temporary workers.
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While the literature has documented difference in demographic characteristics between temporary and permanent workers Sullivan (1995 and 1997) , Polivka (1996) , Cohany (1998)), little is known about the characteristics of firms that use temporary workers. One reason might have been lack of data on the detailed characteristics of firms using temporary workers.
Such data have been limited because temporary workers are not on the payroll of firms at which they engage in production activities. Thus, they are not in the employment data collected in the major economic surveys or censuses, such as the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and the
Census of Manufactures (CM).
3 Abowd et al., (1999) examine French data 4 that distinguish contract type (short-term or permanent) of employment and report that short-term contracts 2 Houseman (2001) surveyed firms about their use of temporary workers and found that a substantial fraction of firms reported meeting fluctuations in demand as a reason. Campbell and Fisher (2004) developed a theoretical model describing firms' decisions to adjust employment of two groups of workers with some of the characteristics of temporary and permanent workers and compare their calibration with aggregate level data. However, there are no empirical studies that examine the relationship between firms' use of temporary workers and their own output fluctuations. 3 This has also caused issues in labor productivity measurement based on payroll data as Houseman (2007) points out. Understanding what kinds of firms use temporary workers helps us to infer whose labor productivity measure might have been influenced. 4 Their data come from four surveys conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.
account for a high share of hires and separations. 5 However, the number of firm characteristics incorporated in their study is limited. In our study, we take advantage of confidential micro data from the U.S. Census Bureau that allows us to link the use of temporary workers to various plantlevel characteristics.
Output fluctuations and the use of temporary workers
As many papers (e.g. Hamermesh (1989) , Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2009), and Campbell and Fisher (2004) ) have considered, costs of hiring and firing permanent workers can be significant. Such adjustment costs are largely absent for temporary workers, for whom the client firm does no recruiting and little training and to whom they have no long-term commitments. Use of temporary workers may, however, incur higher hourly labor costs; because working as a temp implies less job security Sullivan (1995, 1997) , Houseman and Polivka, 2000) workers may demand higher wages for a temporary job than a permanent job. In addition, temporary help agencies charge client firms a markup over the wage that workers receive and productivity may be lower for those under temporary employment contracts, which increases the costs for an effective unit of labor. Kilcoyne shows that in lowskilled occupations, temporary workers typically are paid lower hourly wages. This may reflect lower productivity; for low-skilled jobs in which experience or reputation are not important for future employment, it may be difficult to motivate temporary workers to achieve a high level of performance because their efforts would not, typically, be rewarded by promotion or future wage increases. The short duration of temporary employment spells also limits increases in workers' firm-specific skills and knowledge. In high-skilled occupations, by contrast, temporary workers are often paid higher hourly wages than permanent workers (Kilcoyne,2005) . 5 They found that two-thirds of all hiring and more than half of all separations are involved with short-term contracts. 6 For example, on average, registered nurses sent by THS agencies earn an hourly wage that is $4.93 more than the national average for this occupation in 2004. Computer programmers sent by THS agencies earn
The relative importance of hourly wage and adjustment costs, and thus the attractiveness of using temporary workers, varies with the nature of output fluctuations. In particular, if adjustment costs are important, firms that expect their output to fall in the future should be more likely to meet current employment needs with temporary workers. In such a situation, the benefits from avoiding the costs of dismissing permanent employees would exceed the costs from high hourly unit labor costs for temps, resulting in a negative relationship between expected output growth and use of temporary workers. Similarly, firms subject to higher output volatility might employ a higher share of temporary workers to reduce the expected costs of dismissing permanent workers. Ono and Sullivan (2006) present a stylized model with these two implications, 7 which we focus on testing, by examining how manufacturing plants' use of temporary workers relates to the conditional expectation and variance of changes in output levels.
Other motivations for using temporary workers While our focus is on examining the extent to which firms use temporary workers to accommodate output fluctuations, other motives may also be important. In particular, points out that firms may use temps to facilitate worker screening. Given the sometimes significant costs of dismissing poorly performing employees, a firm may want to first observe $7.85 more per hour than those hired as permanent employees. For occupations in which past experience or licenses help firms identify workers' skills, firms would be able to select temporary workers who are qualified to meet a given performance level. Among workers with the same qualifications, however, they would not take temporary positions unless compensation for job insecurity is provided. Employers may also be willing to pay a premium to quickly meet, say, a sudden increase in demand. 7 Ono and Sullivan (2006) construct a simple 2-period model in which firms take output as given and take into account the potential costs of firing permanent workers in the 2 nd period in determining the 1 st period levels of permanent and temporary workers. In particular, the firm sets the 1 st period permanent employment level so that the expected discounted costs of firing an additional permanent worker in the 2 nd period are equal to the extra current labor costs of substituting temporary workers. When the firm's expected growth rate is lower, the expected discounted costs of firing an additional permanent worker is greater, and the firm relies more on temporary workers in the 1 st period. In addition, in their model, while greater output uncertainty may increase or decrease the probability of needing to fire the marginal permanent worker in the 2 nd period, when firing costs are sufficiently high, greater uncertainty increases the probability of needing to dismiss an additional permanent worker, which in turn, causes the firm to use fewer permanent workers and more temporary workers. their performance as temporary workers. If that performance is judged inadequate, the firm can simply request a new worker from the THS agency. Such a trial period as a temporary worker may be preferable to a formal probationary period as a regular employee. Thus, when expecting greater output growth, the firm may increase its use of temporary workers to secure enough qualified workers for subsequent periods or may simply speed up the screening process and convert qualified temps to permanent workers, maintaining the same temporary worker share.
Depending on the primary motive for using temporary workers, higher expected output growth would affect use of temporary workers differently. If the primary motive for using temporary workers is to reduce the potential costs of dismissing permanent workers, expectations of higher output growth would be associated with less use of temporary workers. Such a relationship would not be found if the primary motive is to screen future permanent workers.
The different motives for using temporary workers also imply different labor market outcomes for temporary workers. As Houseman and Polivka (2000) and Houseman (2001) point out, while the growth of temporary work arrangements or other non-standard arrangements is usually thought to reduce job stability, if firms use these arrangements primarily to screen workers for regular jobs, then the practice may facilitate better matches between workers and firms, leading to greater job stability for these workers. Few empirical papers, however, compare the motivations for firms to use temporary workers.
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Plant characteristics and the use of temporary workers
We also study how temporary worker share depends on other plant characteristics, such as size, age, and the product produced. There are number of reasons why plant size may matter for plants' use of temporary workers. For example, the use of temporary workers to buffer fluctuations in 8 In Houseman and Polivka (2000) , only weak evidence is found for a firm's use of temporary workers for screening purpose, while there was clear evidence that temporary workers face much more job insecurities than regular full or part-time workers. Houseman (2001) also reports many employers report the use of temporary workers as accommodating fluctuations in their work load rather than screening. labor requirements may require a level of sophistication more likely to be found in a large plant.
Larger plants may also be able to negotiate a lower margin from a THS firm. In addition, a larger plant, with its deeper pockets, may face higher costs in the event of an unjust dismissal lawsuit.
On the other hand, larger plants may be better able to redistribute its permanent workers across different production processes, and thus more flexible in the absence of temporary worker usage.
Plant age and industry may also matter for the use of temporary workers because of their effect on the level of uncertainty and other factors.
We also investigate how the use of temporary workers is associated with a plant's wage and benefit levels. It has been suggested that the use of temporary workers may allow client firms to circumvent nondiscrimination requirements in the provision of benefits Sullivan, (1995 and 1997) and Houseman (2001) ). To secure the tax advantages associated with providing certain benefits, firms normally need to provide those benefits to all their employees. However, if a firm would like to avoid providing a certain benefit to a particular segment of its workforce without jeopardizing its tax status, one strategy might be to staff that segment with employees of a THS agency. 9 Thus, t is possible that a plant whose permanent workers earn high wage rates is more motivated to use temporary workers. On the other hand, industry observers indicate that THS agencies charge client firms a higher markup over wages for higher skilled workers (Kilcoyne (2004) ). Thus, it is possible that a firm with a high wage rate for permanent workers might actually use fewer temporary workers. A similar argument applies to firms that provides generous benefit packages.
Finally, we analyze how the temporary worker share at the three-digit NAICS industry level is dependent upon several additional variables. These variables include unionization, labor 9 The legal issues surrounding the employment status of temporary workers are complex. A temporary worker can under some circumstances be considered an employee of the client firm. In particular, in the Microsoft case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that temporary workers who provided services to Microsoft for a period of several years were entitled to benefits, including stock options, which Microsoft provided to all its permanent employees. The Microsoft decision has limited firms' ability to implement such a strategy of using the same temporary workers for long periods.
turnover rates, and seasonality. Unions are likely to resist the use of temporary workers and thus we expect a negative relationship between temporary worker share and the unionization rate.
Note, however, that unionization may also increase wage rates. As we control for wages, the coefficient for unionization rate would tell us about its marginal effect.
When voluntary turnover is high, the likelihood of needing to dismiss workers due to insufficient demand is lower, which suggests a negative relationship between temporary worker share and the turnover rate. At the same time, higher voluntary turnover rates would likely increase the value of screening potential employees and thus could lead to greater use of temporary workers. A stronger seasonal component would also be positively correlated with the higher use of temporary workers, ceteris paribus.
In Section 2, we discuss empirical implementation and describe our data in more detail.
In Section 3, we present our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Data
We use the plant-level data from the Plant Capacity Utilization (PCU) survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.
10 Beginning in 1998, the PCU survey began collecting information on manufacturing plants' usage of temporary workers , which in the PCU questionnaires are defined as "production workers not on the payroll (hired through temporary help agencies or as their own agent)". Available to our study are the data for 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 , which provide the number of such workers in the fourth quarter of each year.
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10 These data are used by the Federal Reserve Board to estimate capacity utilization rates for the manufacturing and publishing industries. 11 The PCU survey is used by the Federal Reserve Board to estimate capacity utilization rates of manufacturing and publishing plants http://www.census.gov/econ/overview/ma0500.html (August 2006) We also link the plant-level PCU data to the plant-level ASM and CM, which allows us to observe a plant's output fluctuations over time. We fit an autoregressive model to each plant's output growth trajectory to create our key variables to capture output fluctuation 12
In our analysis, we include manufacturing plants that are in operation and that provide valid answers to the key employment questions. We further select those for which we can calculate measures of the expected level and volatility of production, as described in detail below.
We also limit our sample to plants that appear in the ASM for enough consecutive years prior to being in the PCU to allow us to use lagged variables in the regressions. Appendix A provides more details about which plants are included in our sample. Combining all years of available PCUs leaves us with about 11,000 plant-years.
Empirical Specification
Let it S represent the share of temporary workers at plant i in year t. Following the above discussion, we specify
, where e it g is the plant's expected growth rate, i  is its degree of output growth uncertainty, it X is a vector of other plant characteristics, β is a vector of parameters, and it  is a random component. it X includes industry dummies as well as other plant characteristics such as plant size and age that may proxy for variation in the level of firing costs and wage differentials between temporary and permanent workers, which should also influence the use of temporary workers. 12 In the PCU questionnaires, "production workers" are defined as workers (up through the line-supervisor level) engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, packing, warehousing, shipping (but not delivering), maintenance, repair, janitorial, guard services, product development, auxiliary production for plant's own use (e.g., power plant), record keeping, and other closely associated services. They also include truck drivers delivering ready-mixed concrete (U.S Census Bureau, 2000) . Note that while the PCU provides employment and hours data for each shift, examining the allocation of permanent and temporary workers between different shifts is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on a plant's overall use of temporary workers for all shifts in total.
As we noted in Section 1, if minimizing hiring and firing costs is the key reason firms use temporary workers, we should find that a lower expected increase in employment, e it g , is associated with more use of temporary workers. We also expect that higher uncertainty, i  , increases the use of temporary workers. Alternatively, if screening is the primary reason why firms use temporary workers, then higher expected output growth would be associated with greater use of temporary workers.
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We estimate Probit and Tobit models to test these hypotheses. Probit analysis shows how our key variables are associated with plants' discrete choices to use any temporary workers. Tobit analysis tells us how the temporary worker shares are associated with our key variables assuming that plants start using temporary workers once the benefit from using them becomes positive and continue to increase their use of temporary workers as such benefits increase. Tobit analysis serves as one way to overcome an issue with a censored dependent variable. In Appendix B, we also show the results of OLS analysis, which simply captures the relationship between temporary worker share and plant characteristics for the plants with positive employment share
Measure for e it g
In order to create an empirical measure of expected output growth, we have to make three choices.
We have to specify empirically the current period, the future period, and how the expectation of the future period's output is estimated. Because information on temporary worker employment from the PCU is that of the fourth quarter, we take the current period to be the fourth quarter of the survey year. We use the annualized fourth quarter total value of shipments (TVS) reported in the PCU survey as the current output; the ASM and the CM, which we use to estimate time series process for TVS, report annual TVS. As a future period, one might view the length of the horizon 13 The screening story does not seem to have an obvious implication for the relationship between uncertainty and firms' use of temporary workers.
considered by the plant for employment decisions as an empirical question to be investigated thoroughly. However, given that no monthly or quarterly output series at plant-level are available, we take the entire year following the survey to be the future period. Note that, to measure the fluctuations that the plant faces in its demand or output, one might also consider using a plant's employment given by the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which provide annual employment data for virtually all U.S. business establishments (that have employees). However, like most other data sources, the employment reported in the LBD includes only workers on a plant's payroll and thus excludes temporary workers. To the extent that a plant uses temporary workers to accommodate output fluctuations, permanent employment fluctuations should be smoother than the fluctuation of all workers including temporary workers.
Thus, any unobserved or uncontrolled factors that increase a plant's use of temporary workers may be translated into a smaller fluctuation in permanent employment, which biases our estimation. Thus, in this paper, we use TVS from the ASM-CM data to capture output fluctuations. 16 We assume that output growth follows a first order autoregressive process with plantspecific parameters. In particular, denoting the growth rate of TVS by gtvs , we estimate: larger than the mean experiences annual output levels that typically deviate from the expected output by over 30%. In our sample, the fraction of plants employing a positive number of temporary workers in a particular year is 41%. Of plants with temporary workers, the temporary worker share averages about 12% of total production workers.
Other Control Variables in Analyses
We also include a number of additional control variables. The most important of these is a variable that controls for the previous level of permanent employees. If a plant's permanent employment in the previous period is greater than the level required to produce the current output, it would be more likely to rely on already hired permanent workers and less likely to rely on temporary workers. Indeed, in a version of Ono and Sullivan (2006) with an autoregressive time series processes for output, the number of permanent workers from the previous period is a state variable. Thus, one might consider controlling for the level of permanent employment, is unproductive, rather than that it has a level of permanent workers on its payroll that is likely to need to be reduced in the future.
As a better way to control for variation in the previous number of permanent workers relative to current output levels, we include plants' recent output growth rates.
17 If a plant's output has been growing, it is unlikely that the number of permanent workers in the last period is binding. However, if output has been falling, the number of permanent workers inherited from the previous period may constrain the plant; in this case, even when a plant's current output is greater for a given future expected level, the plant would be unlikely to use temporary workers.
In addition to the control for the previous level of permanent employees, we control for several other variables that may influence a plant's use of temporary workers. Such variables include plant size, age, and whether a plant is a part of a multi-plant firm or not. For plant size, we use 4 AQ it ltvs . Age is measured based on the first year that a plant's identifier for its physical location appeared in the LBD.
As we discussed earlier, we also include various other variables. We control for the wage rate of permanent workers and the ratio of benefit payments to wages at the plant-level. To calculate the permanent production worker wage rate, P it w , for each plant, we use the ASM; the PCU does not provide any wage information. Note that we cannot distinguish overtime hours from total production hours in the ASM. Thus the calculation for The PCU data provide information on hours for all production workers (including temporary workers), hours worked by temporary workers (including overtime if any), and total overtime. Assuming that PCU, and use this measure in our regressions. We also use the ASM to calculate supplemental labor costs for each dollar of wage payments.
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We further add the unionization rate, turnover rate, and the seasonal factor for the fourth quarter at the 3-digit SIC industry level. The unionization rate, turnover rate, and seasonal component are all calculated at the three-digit SIC level, as plant-level information is not available. The data on the unionization rate among production workers are derived from the monthly outgoing rotation files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). We pooled data from 1996 through 2000 to estimate the rate of unionization for each three-digit SIC industry. As a proxy for voluntary turnover, we use job-to-job transition rates based on the non-outgoing rotation groups of CPS. 20 The job-to-job transition rate would be more associated with the tendency of workers to voluntary quit than the overall turnover rate. . When we include the above 3-overtime is performed only by permanent workers, we use the ratio of the overtime to the hours worked by permanent workers. We also used the ratio of overtime to hours worked by all workers, which did not qualitatively change our results. 19 Supplemental labor costs are not provided separately for production and non-production workers in the ASM/CM. We divide such a total number by wage payments to all employees. Note that some years in the micro data provide the decomposition of supplemental labor costs into voluntary and non-voluntary parts. Such data are not available for the years relevant to this study. 20 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces a voluntary quit rate, but only at the level of broad industry category, which does not provide us enough detail for our study. 21 Specifically, we matched each observation in the non-outgoing rotations to the corresponding observation in the following month using the household ID and line numbers. In addition, we required that the sex of respondents match and that the reported ages be within one year of each other. We then determined which workers remained employed at the same firm as in the previous month using the employment status variable and the indicator for whether an employed worker remained at his previous employer. This latter variable is available starting in 1996 and makes possible the identification of job-tojob transitions. See Fallick and Flieshman (2004) .
digit SIC level variables in our models, we report standard errors that account for clustering at the 3-digit SIC level. 
Results
In Table 2 , we report estimates of our base specification with and without industry dummies. The coefficient of
, 4 e Q it g is negative and significant, and that of i  is positive and significant. Thus the data support the view that higher expected growth decreases both a plant's likelihood of using temporary workers and, for a plant that uses temporary workers, decreases its temporary worker share. One interpretation is that the expectation of higher growth reduces the probability that the marginal permanent worker will need to be dismissed, which in turn reduces the expected future firing costs and motivates a plant to use more permanent workers. Note that, as we discussed, it is still possible that a higher expectation of growth might necessitate more screening of future permanent workers and thus more current temporary workers, but in our analysis, such effects seem to be dominated by the former effect. It is also possible that screening matters for short-run growth prospects, while our data do not allow us to capture plant-level growth rates at the monthly or quarterly levels.
We also perform the analysis controlling for a variable representing a current year shock, Plants that face more uncertainty appear to use more temporary workers. One interpretation is that greater uncertainty increases the probability that the marginal permanent worker will need to be dismissed, discouraging plants from using permanent employees. For plants using temporary workers, an uncertainty level one s.d. greater than average is associated with a temporary worker share that is 0.6 percentage points higher than average, based on the Tobit result with industry dummies. A similar result is found with OLS. 22 We also performed quantile regression analysis using data from plants with at least some temporary workers to see whether the magnitude of effects vary between plants in different quartiles of the distribution of the temporary worker share. The quantile regressions showed that, among plants with temporary workers, the magnitudes of the effects of our key variables are much greater for plants with higher temporary worker shares. Once we replace our dependent variable with the log of the temporary worker share, however, the quantile regressions obtain almost the same coefficients across all quantiles, indicating that the effects of our key variables are roughly constant in terms of the percentage by which they increase the share. 22 We also performed Probit and Tobit analyses replacing expected annual output level in 1 t  with its realized value. For this exercise, out of 4,909 plants used in Table 3 , we used the data of 4,617 plants, which appear in ASM sample in the year following their PCU survey. The results remain qualitatively the same.
The results generally suggest that bigger plants are more likely to use temporary workers, and if they do, the temporary worker share is greater than for smaller plants. It is possible that fixed costs are involved in using temporary workers for, perhaps, negotiating with temporary help agencies. Our results are also consistent with larger plants facing greater costs in the event of an unjust dismissal lawsuit. Such an effect seems to offset possible negative effects, if any, from larger plants' ability to redistribute assignments across permanent workers. A one s.d. increase in 4 AQ it ltvs raises a plant's likelihood to use temporary workers by 4.1 percentage points. Note that the ability to negotiate or allocate workers should be better captured at the firm level rather than plant level.
Our analysis also controls for a dummy indicating whether the plant is affiliated with multi-plant firm. The dummy obtains a positive coefficient for Probit, but among plants with temporary workers, the dummy obtains a negative coefficient (see OLS result in Appendix B). It is possible that the plants in a multi-plant firm can share the fixed costs, which justify each plant to use temporary worker even by a small amount.
We found that older plants tend to use temporary workers less. The likelihood of plants built pre-1975 using temporary workers is 8.2 percentage points smaller than newer plants. For plants using temporary workers, the temporary worker share for older plants is 3.7 percentage points lower than the young plants. Plant age may reflect the degree of uncertainty that is not captured by i
 is an average measure of uncertainty over the lifecycle of a plant, the degree of uncertainty may change over time.
While we treated firms' output growth rates as exogenous, in reality, a firms' use of flexible labor can influence their output adjustment. To the degree that such adjustments are not predicted by equation (12), it may decrease or increase our measure of uncertainty. For example, with easy access to temporary workers, under negative labor productivity shocks, a firm may be able to keep its output stable using temporary workers rather than decreasing its output; this may lower our measure of uncertainty. On the other hand, the firm may adjust output more flexibly with access to temporary workers, which may increase our measure of uncertainty. Such effects are screened out to some extend by industry dummies and other controls. As we show later, we also control for geographical area fixed effects and the key results remain the same.
However, as a robustness check, we also create a variable for a plant's output volatility using only the data before 1985, when the use of THS by manufacturing plants was not common. 23 The growth of the THS industry likely reduced the costs of dealing with temporary employment assignments, and increased manufacturing plants' use of temporary workers in general. Thus by using the output data before 1985, we can capture a manufacturing plant's output volatility minimizing the influence of its use of temporary workers. We denote the new measure by Table 3 , the coefficients for
are positive, and for the Probit analysis, the coefficient turns more significant than in Table 2 . Table 4 summarizes the effect of other variables, including wage, unionization rate, jobto-job transition rates, and seasonality. As discussed earlier, one might expect that plants that pay high wages or high benefits would have an incentive to use temporary workers to reduce labor costs. In contrast, industry analysts report that the markup that staffing agencies charge over wages for temporary workers tends to be higher for high wage occupations. Thus, higher wage plants may use fewer temporary workers. In our analysis, the latter story seems to dominate. The straight-time wage for permanent production workers and the supplemental labor costs per dollar of permanent worker wages are both negatively correlated with plants' use of temporary workers.
Note that when we control for these two variables, the positive coefficient obtained for plant size becomes bigger. Since larger plants tend to pay higher wages, once we separate the negative effect of wage, the scale effect seems to be more pronounced.
Next we add the unionization rate, the turnover rate, and the fourth-quarter seasonal component, which we measure at the three-digit SIC level. Columns 4, 5, 6 in Table 4 show the results where we replace three-digit SIC dummies with these three continuous variables. The results suggest that more highly unionized industries tend to make less use of temporary workers. This is counter to the idea that unions might increase the use of temporary workers through their effect in increasing wages as well as firing costs relative to productivity. Similar results are found in the study by Houseman (2001) . Analogous to what she argues, it is possible that our results reflect the fact that unions oppose the use of non-standard employment relationships in order to secure more regular employment positions. Note that we also examined whether the unionization rate has any interaction effect with , 4 e Q it g . The interaction term obtained a negative coefficient, suggesting that greater union pressures against the use of temporary work arrangements also enhance the negative effect of , 4 e Q it g on a plants' likelihood to use temporary workers.
Coefficients for the job-to-job transition rate are not significant in any specification. This is different from our original conjecture that higher voluntary turnover reduces the probability of needing to dismiss permanent workers in the future and thus increases the permanent worker share. As we discussed, it is possible that greater voluntary turnover increases the on-going need to screen workers through temporary employment, and this might have offset the effect of the decreased probability of needing to fire permanent workers. The coefficients for the fourthquarter seasonal component are positive and significant; the higher seasonal component for output increases the use of temporary workers.
Variations of our control variables such as wage, benefit, and unionization rate appear to have relatively large effects on the overall variation in plants' use of temporary workers. Based on the Probit analysis in Column 4 in Table 4 , one s.d. increase in wage, benefit, unionization rate, and fourth-quarter seasonal factor decrease the probability for a plant to use some temporary workers by 6.9, 2.8, 3.8, and 2.7 percentage points, respectively. In terms of the variation of temporary worker shares across plants, based on the Tobit analysis in Column 5 in Table 4 , one s.d. increase in wage, benefit, unionization rate, and fourth-quarter seasonal factor decrease the share by 2.6, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.1 percentage points, respectively.
Finally, we examine whether our key results hold once we control for the effects of geographical variables. In Columns 1, 2, 3 in Table 5 , we show the results based on our base specification, adding a dummy indicating urban plants (plants in metropolitan areas). We then limit our sample to urban plants and control for Metropolitan statistical area fixed effects in addition to three-digit industry effects. We find that in both cases, the effect of our key variables stays qualitatively the same. We also found that plants in urban area are more likely to use temporary workers. To the extent that markets for temporary worker are local, there are many geographic variables such as the unemployment rate and the degree of local concentration of temporary agencies, which would be associated with a plant's use of temporary workers.
Examining the effect of these variables requires a thorough consideration of local labor markets.
We leave it to our future research to explore the influence of local demand and supply of the temporary workers on a plant's use of temporary workers.
Conclusion
We have provided some evidence in support of the proposition that temporary work arrangements facilitate flexibility in firms' use of labor and allow them to accommodate output fluctuations with lower hiring and firing costs. In particular, we focused on examining how firms' use of temporary workers is associated with its expected output growth and the uncertainty it faces. We approximated these two variables using the ASM and the CM, and performed Probit, Tobit, and OLS analyses to test our hypotheses.
First, we find that plants make greater use of temporary workers when their expected output growth is lower. This suggests that a plant chooses temporary workers over permanent workers when it expects its output to fall and thus wants to avoid costs associated with dismissing permanent employees. This effect remains identified after netting out the effect of a seasonal factor in a plant's output, which itself had a positive relationship with a plant's use of temporary workers, as well as other variables.
Second, we find that a plant with greater uncertainty over its future output level uses more temporary workers. It seems that more volatile plants make greater attempts to reduce the costs of firing permanent workers; this might have made the plant rely more on temporary workers even though the current unit costs of using temporary workers is greater than those for permanent workers.
In addition to output fluctuations, we also examine the effect of several other motivations that are thought to play an important role in a plant's decision to use temps. First, we found evidence that plant's that require high-skill workers are less likely to use temporary workers, likely because the wage premium or the margin paid to agencies for high-skill temporary workers may be higher than that for low-skill temporary workers. Second, a plant in an industry that is highly unionized seems to use fewer temporary workers, possibly because unions are successful in resisting the use of nonmembers' labor. Robust z-statistics for Probit, t-statistics for Tobit, and robust t-statistics for OLS (errors are clustered for plants in the same three-digit SIC for Columns 4 and 6); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% In the questionnaire, plants are asked to report, for each shift, the total number of production workers, temporary production workers, total hours worked by production workers, hours worked by temporary workers, and overtime hours. We consider that a plant operates a given shift if it reports positive total production workers for the shift, who are defined to include temporary workers in the instructions for the questionnaire given to the plant. Among plants operating a particular shift, however, many left the information for temporary production workers unfilled, and often, such plants do not provide a temporary worker number for any shift. In such a case, it is not clear whether the plant did not use temporary workers or did not fill out the item. We consider that they did not fill out the item, since the instructions for the PCU survey explicitly instructs them both in words and with visual examples of the tables to write zero when plants operate a given shift but do not use temporary workers. We exclude such plants with missing temporary employment data for any of their active shifts (i.e., shifts for which the plant reports positive total number of production workers).
In addition, by the definition given in the instructions, when a given shift exists, the total number of production workers should be greater than or equal to the number of temporary workers. We exclude plants with any inconsistency regarding these figures. We also exclude a few plants reporting the same number for both total and temporary workers for some shifts. It is possible that these shifts are actually supported by only temporary workers. However, such incidents are rare and we cannot tell whether these are miss data entry.
Once we clean the PCU data, we limit the sample to those for which we can estimate our key variables based on the ASM and the CM as discussed in the main text. Based on the method discussed in Section 3, for a plant to be included in estimation, the plant has to appear in consecutive three years more than once in ASM-CM panel. We limit our sample to plants that appear in three years consecutively at least three times to avoid outliers. Some further outliers based on other variables are excluded. 
